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I.

INTRODUCTION

Over 150 nations have been engaged in the negotiation of a multilateral Convention on the Law of the Sea at the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea for more than five years.
The negotiations have included virtually every possible issue involving relations between nations with respect to the oceans, such
as fishing, national jurisdiction, navigation, environment, scientific research, seabed exploitation, and transfer of technology.' The
current product of that negotiation is the Informal Composite Ne* Presented to the International Studies Association, Washington, D.C., on
Feb. 24, 1978. The research for this article was supported by grants from the
Vanderbilt University Research Council and the Vanderbilt University School of
Law.
** Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. B.A., 1965, New York
University; J.D., 1968, University of Wisconsin.
1. See Charney, Law of the Sea: Breaking the Deadlock, 55 FOREIGN AFF. 598
(1977); Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The
1977 New York Session, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 57 (1978); Oxman, The Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1976 New York Sessions, 71 Am.
J. INT'L L. 247 (1977).
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gotiating Text (ICNT), a 198-page document containing 303 treaty
articles plus seven annexes. 2 Although the participating nations
agree on much of the text, significant differences still remain on a
number of key issues which could destroy prospects for agreement
on the entire text. It is the thesis of this article that the cumulative
interests of the United States in the entry into force of an internationally acceptable Convention on the Law of the Sea are strong.
However, the alternatives to a treaty, although not optimal, are
also acceptable.
Two categories of major United States interests must be reviewed in order to obtain a clear understanding of the issues involved. They are the United States general international relations
interests and the United States substantive interests directly at
stake in the negotiations. The general international relations interests of the United States include: (1) the impact of the instant
negotiations on multilateral relations, particularly north-south relations; (2) the precedential effect on other international issues of
the terms of a Law of the Sea Convention; (3) the future use of the
Conference negotiating processes; and (4) the development of a
dispute settlement system that could permit greater use of third
party dispute settlement in international relations. The United
States primary substantive interests in the negotiations concern:
(1) the exploitation of the living resources of the seas; (2) the
protection of the marine environment; (3) the conduct of marine
scientific research; (4) the military and commercial freedoms of
ocean navigation and use; and (5) the exploitation of the non-living
resources of the deep seabed.'
How would these major interests be affected by the entry into
force of a Convention on the Law of the Sea as contrasted with the
2.
3.

U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP.10 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ICNT].
Other less significant issues from the perspective of United States interests

include the limits of the continental shelf, the delimitation of the baseline from
which the territorial sea is measured, revenue sharing, the rights of the landlocked
and geographically disadvantaged states, ocean boundaries between opposite and
adjacent states, and transfer of technology (aside from deep seabed technology).
Although the United States direct interest in the Landlocked and Geographically Disadvantaged States issue is low, the item has developed into a major

conference issue. Over 50 members of that group (a blocking one-third) are
seeking to link success on their issues to a positive vote on the text. If the United
States wants a convention for other reasons, it must assure that this issue is
resolved. Similarly, procedural issues such as those extant at the commencement
of the 1978 session of the Conference, the status of the Conference President,
Hamilton Shirley Amerasinghe, and the power of the Committee Chairmen to
veto changes in the ICNT, are important roadblocks to the negotiation.
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no-convention alternative? This article will review the United
States interests in relation to that question, concluding that the
cumulative effect of the individual interests makes it important
that the United States vigorously pursue a convention.
II.

INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN GENERAL
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The approach the United States should take towards multilateral relations, particularly with the Third World, is by no means
clear. It is clear, however, that a failure of the Conference will
substantively affect those relations. If the Law of the Sea negotiations were to fail, there would be greater tension in the relations
between the north and south. Efforts to achieve multilateral solutions for a number of multilateral issues might be frustrated, with
prejudice to the chances of achieving needed multilateral agreements in such areas as the Antarctic, space, energy, food, other
commodities, and the environment. Furthermore, the failure of the
Conference could produce such a caustic atmosphere that constructive cooperation and trade between the United States and
other nations in an interdependent world would be hampered. The
issues under negotiation at the Conference are not among the most
critical issues facing mankind; nevertheless, the injuries that could
result from a Conference collapse would have a destabilizing impact that could adversely affect those more critical issues. Finally,
the failure to provide greater certainty and predictability in nations' ocean relations would lay the foundation for future oceanrelated difficulties for the United States. In sum, a Conference
failure could adversely affect international relations while a success which produces a convention could have a positive impact on
those relations.
Four arguments are put forward to controvert these views. First,
the Conference negotiations are arguably so unique that a Conference failure would not substantively affect other subjects. Second,
it is felt that the risk of creating a destabilized situation is worth
the protection of those United States interests likely to be sacrificed if a convention similar to the ICNT were to become law.
Third, it is believed that a Conference failure precipitated by a
United States refusal to compromise on certain interests would
add to international stability by assuring continued protection for
many United States interests. Finally, it is argued that the United
States is so sufficiently independent of other nations that it would
not be adversely affected by the reactions of other nations.
The first argument simply ignores the linkage with other international subjects already made in the negotiations, particularly
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with respect to economic issues. A response to the second argument
requires reference to the substantive interests at stake and will be
dealt with in the main body of this article. Nevertheless, this argument does not refute the view that there will be negative impacts;
rather, it answers that the costs would be acceptable. The third
and fourth arguments overstate the ability of the United States to
control international relations or to insulate itself from the actions
of other countries.
It has been argued that a critical matter raised by the Law of
the Sea negotiations is the precedential effect that would result
from a United States compromise on certain issues under negotiation-concessions made in the composition and voting system of
the International Seabed Authority and in the Authority's power
to institute economic controls over deep seabed mining.4 Arguably,
such concessions would be "pocketed" by the Group of 77, thereby
making the principles contained in those concessions binding on
the United States in other negotiations where its interests may be
different, such as the UNCTAD commodity negotiations. Thus,
the United States is urged to resist such compromises at the Law
of the Sea Conference even if a policy analysis of the issues at stake
at the instant negotiation would favor a concession. In fact, it is
difficult to conceive of a way that a concession made at the Law
of the Sea Conference could produce a binding effect or even strong
precedential effect on a United States position at any other negotiation. There is no international legal obligation that would impose such a result. Furthermore, the context and nature of the Law
of the Sea negotiations, particularly the deep seabed negotiations,
are such that substantive concessions made there can be readily
distinguished from any other negotiation. While other countries
could urge the United States to take similar positions at other
negotiations, there is no reason why the United States would need
to acquiesce in those pleas if it is not in the interest of the United
States to do so. Timely statements disclaiming any broad implications could be made to assure that no such implications could be
derived from a concession if one is made. Similar actions could be
readily taken to foreclose the establishment of an inappropriate
precedent within the foreign affairs bureaucracy of the United
States government.
Little attention has been given to two developments in multilateral relations that have taken place at the Law of the Sea Confer4. Darman, The Law of the Sea: Rethinking U.S. Interests, 56 FOREIGN AFr.
373, 387 (1977).
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ence: movement toward a consensus system of negotiating multilateral agreements and movement toward broad use of third party
dispute settlement for treaty-based disputes. Both have importance to the United States beyond the scope of the Law of the Sea
Conference. If these developments are successful in the instant
negotiations, they might be available for use elsewhere. The consensus system assures that decision-making at a multilateral negotiation of a convention will not be dominated by the numerical
superiority of any group of nations.' Rather, procedural significance will be given to the variations in the power of nations. Since
it is difficult to obtain acceptance of voting systems that overtly
recognize the differences in nations' importance, the consensus
approach permits the maintenance of an egalitarian procedure
which in practice may assure that multilateral negotiations reflect
the real geopolitical power of the participating nations. The future
availability of this tool may strongly depend on the success of the
Law of the Sea Conference.
Ambiguities in treaty texts produced at multilateral negotiations inevitably lead to disputes. When negotiations to settle a
dispute fail, a need arises to resolve the dispute peaceably for the
sake of the disputants as well as the other parties to the agreement.
Unfortunately, despite high expectations, the International Court
of Justice has not developed into an acceptable comprehensive
compulsory dispute settlement system'for these purposes. Although compulsory dispute settlement is provided for in numerous
specific international agreements, efforts to expand the role of
such systems have met with little success. A significant breakthrough is taking place at the Law of the Sea Conference as a
consequence of the wide acceptance of a comprehensive dispute
settlement system. Even such traditional opponents of this approach as the Eastern European countries have given their support.
During the course of these negotiations, it has become clear that
the traditional reluctance to participate in compulsory dispute settlement systems could be overcome by the creative development
of a multifaceted dispute settlement system.' Final conclusion of
such a negotiation and its successful implementation could pave
5. Sohn, Voting Proceduresin United Nations Conferences for the Codification of InternationalLaw, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 310, 333-52 (1975).
6. See ICNT, supra note 2, arts. 279-97; id. annexes 4-7; Adede, Law of the
Sea-The Integrationof the System of Settlement of Disputes Under the Draft
Convention as a Whole, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 84 (1978).
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the way for broader use of compulsory dispute settlement in the
future. Greater use of compulsory dispute settlement could contribute to stable international relations which will benefit the
United States. Thus, a number of specific interests of the United
States outside the scope of the Law of the Sea Conference may be
benefited by the conclusion of an acceptable Convention on the
Law of the Sea.
III.

SUBSTANTIVE UNITED STATES LAW OF THE SEA INTERESTS

Five significant substantive United States interests are at stake
in the Law of the Sea negotiations: living resource exploitation,
marine environment, marine science, navigation and use of the
oceans, and deep seabed mineral development. It appears that
these interests can be better protected under a Convention on the
Law of the Sea likely to be produced at the Law of the Sea Conference.
A.

Living Resources

At the commencement of the Law of the Sea negotiations it was
hoped that significant positive developments could take place to
improve the conservation and management of the living resources
of the seas. Unfortunately, these developments were thwarted by
a period of massive national ocean expansionism. As a consequence, an apparently rational, species-oriented living resource
management system was cast aside in favor of a 200-mile zone of
national jurisdiction. Although the ICNT includes many references to particular species, the text places the major management
power over living resources found within 200 miles of a nation's
coast in the hands of the individual coastal states, subject to certain fairly vague management policies.' The living resources found
beyond the 200-mile zone would be subject to similar vaguely defined management policies.' Nevertheless, the ICNT does provide
for international cooperation and non-coastal state participation9
that would qualify coastal state control within 200 miles and
broaden the focus of the resource management system. In contrast,
in the absence of the Convention all control over living resources
within 200 miles of the coast would ultimately fall under the juris7. Id. arts. 56, 61-67.
8. Id. arts. 116-20. See also id. arts. 66(3), 67(2), which limit fishing for anadromous and catadromous stocks to the Exclusive Economic Zone.
9. Id. arts. 63, 64, 69-71.
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diction of the coastal states and the area beyond would be left
without even a framework for comprehensive management. Although the United States 200-mile zone is one of the largest and
contains a significant amount of resources, the United States interests may be protected best by a more international approach to
fisheries management for two reasons." First, the United States
has distant water fishery industries that would benefit from greater
international cooperation in the management of and access to the
living resources of the oceans. Second, the United States has a
strong interest in rational management of all the ocean's living
resources. Because of the migratory nature and interdependence of
many of the ocean's living resources, international cooperative
management is desirable if the United States is to obtain optimum
benefit from these resources. The ICNT does provide the framework for such cooperative management which would be absent
under the no-convention route. Although a number of management agreements are in existence now, their failure to resolve
many of the conservation issues has been at least partially responsible for the development of the 200-mile zone. Ad hoc approaches
to the management of the ocean's living resources will continue if
the Conference fails; more regional agreements will be forthcoming. The opportunities for comprehensive management, however,
would be lessened in the absence of a Law of the Sea Convention.
B.

Marine Environment

The same marginal benefit that the ICNT provides in the case
of the living resources of the seas is found in the treatment of the
marine environment. There is much developing country indifference and even hostility toward strong efforts to protect the environment on the ground that actions to protect the environment might
hamper their economic development. In the absence of treaty obligations and the companion international pressure, many nations
would pay little heed to ocean environment concerns. The ICNT
represents some progress toward the protection of ocean environment, while setting the stage for more significant future developments. Although no specific marine environment standards are
contained in the ICNT, the text does set out general standards and
10. For tables ranking coastal states according to size and coastal length, and
estimating their gains or losses under various proposed jurisdictional boundaries,
see Hodgson & McIntyre, National Seabed Boundary Options, in LIMITS TO NATIONAL JURISDICTION OVER THE SEA 152, 155-64 (G. Yates & J. Young eds. 1974).
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allocates enforcement responsibilities that go far beyond the current flag state system." It provides for port state and coastal state
enforcement in the case of certain violations within the 200-mile
zone and in the ocean beyond."2 Other sections provide for the
establishment of international marine environment standards for
ship construction and operation, the publication of environmental
impact studies prior to authorization of activities that would cause
significant harmful changes to the marine environment, and the
regulation of pollution from deep seabed mining operations.1 3 Absent a convention, these worldwide protections for the marine environment may be impossible to attain."
C.

Scientific Research

Currently, much controversy exists within the United States
over the marine scientific research provisions of the ICNT. 5 Encouraging the acquisition of knowledge by minimizing restrictions
on the conduct of marine scientific research is clearly in the longterm interest of the United States and the world. That interest
unfortunately conflicts with coastal state ocean expansionism.
Consequently, the coastal states have sought provisions that would
require coastal state consent before marine scientists engage in
research within the 200-mile zone. Under current international
law, the conduct of marine scientific research outside the territorial sea not involving the resources of the continental shelf is
considered a freedom of the high seas."6 In practice, that right is
11. ICNT, supra note 2, arts. 193-238.
12. Id. arts. 212, 219, 221.
13. Id. arts. 207, 210, 212.
14. In an action contrary to the goal of establishing international marine
environment protections, the United States recently enacted legislation claiming
jurisdiction to regulate the discharge of oil and other hazardous substances within
200 miles of the United States coast. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95217, § 58, 91 Stat. 1566 (amending 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1970); see S. REP. No. 95370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 6597.

The jurisdictional effect of the statute, if not its very existence, is arguably
contrary to other United States interests at stake in the negotiations. At the same

time, the legislation does not significantly expand the power of the United States
to protect the marine environment in the adjacent seas. Virtually all traffic within

the area in question could be regulated under existing port state jurisdiction.
15. ICNT, supra note 2, arts. 239-66.
16. See Convention on the High Seas, opened for signatureApril 29, 1958, art.
2, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 11 (entered into force Sept.
30, 1962). Cf. Convention on the Continental Shelf, opened for signatureApril 29,
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eroding so quickly that absent a convention, the consent of the
coastal state will be required before any scientific research is conducted within the 200-mile zone.
The Convention alternative provides certain limited advantages
over the no-convention route. Although it provides for a consent
regime, the ICNT does contain a number of provisions that would
encourage and expedite coastal state consent and would provide
for some uniformity in the treatment of marine scientistsY Under
these provisions a coastal state may deny the right to conduct
research only for certain reasons. 8 The provisions further set forth
a specific time limit within which a denial must be made if the
coastal state is not to be deemed to have consented. The consent
requirement is eliminated in the case of operations conducted
under the umbrella of an acceptable international organization. In
return, the coastal states are permitted to have access to the research data and to demand the right to participate in the research.'9 Although these ICNT provisions do not represent compelling improvements over the no-convention alternative, they do provide benefits to the marine scientists which may be most valuable
in the future, particularly since they place some limitations on
coastal state action. To the extent that the Convention would enable scientists to conduct more marine scientific research than in
the absence of a convention, the Convention is a net benefit to the
United States.
D.

Ocean Navigation and Related Uses

The initial efforts of the mid-1960s to commence the Law of the
Sea negotiations were stimulated primarily by the desire of the
United States and the Soviet Union to protect traditional commercial and military navigation and use of the oceans. It was clear at
1958, art. 2, para. 2, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (entered
into force June 10, 1954) (requirement of consent by coastal state for research
undertaken on the continental shelf). The consent requirement contained in the
Continental Shelf Convention has raised substantial obstacles to any research in
the waters above the continental shelf. The ICNT would ameliorate some of these
problems. See ICNT, supra note 2, arts. 243-53.
17. ICNT, supra note 2, arts. 247-54.
18. The key limitation on the grounds available for the denial of consent is
the use of the phrase "in normal circumstances." See id. art. 247(3). The history
of this term indicates that severe diplomatic disputes between the interested
states would have to be present. See Oxman, supra note 1, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. at
76-77.
19. ICNT, supra note 2, art. 250.
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that time that important straits were in the process of being incorporated within the territorial sovereignty of coastal states through
expanded territorial seas claims. The primary goal of these maritime nations was to insure that the traditional high seas freedoms
of military and commercial transit through and over those straits
would continue. The ICNT would protect that interest through its
provisions on transit passage through and over straits used for
international navigation.2" Similar interests have been protected in
the Exclusive Economic Zone and Archipelagic waters.2 '
Two questions have been raised in connection with the straits
passage issue. First, does that interest in straits transit still exist?
Second, would the interest be protected outside of the Convention?
Although the United States is increasingly reluctant to involve
itself in military activities throughout the world, it is clear that it
retains a strong interest in international navigation, particularly
through and over straits. In order to review the military interest,
the analysis is divided into two parts-the United States nuclear
weapons interest and its conventional military-geopolitical activities interest. 2
With the advent of missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons far from a submarine launching pad, it is clear that the real
United States nuclear weapons interest in ocean navigation is to
hide those weapons-carrying submarines in the oceans so that they
cannot be destroyed in a first-strike action. The United States
borders on the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, the Bering Sea and the
Gulf of Mexico. Its submarines are capable of staying away from
port for long periods of time. It is thus highly debatable whether
the United States has a great need for unimpeded submerged
straits passage into other ocean areas for such submarines.
The conventional military activities interest of the United
States is still significant. Although the likelihood of direct wartime
action in distant lands seems to be decreasing, there are other
geopolitical uses that have current importance. Examples of these
uses include the location of United States Navy ships off the Horn
of Africa during the recent Somalia-Ethiopia conflict23 and the
20. Id. arts. 37-44; see Burke, Who Goes Where, When and How: International
Law of the Sea for Transportation,31 INT'L ORG'N 267 (1977); Burke, Submerged
Passage Through Straits: Interpretationsof the ProposedLaw of the Sea Treaty
Text, 52 WASH. L. REv. 193 (1977).

21. ICNT, supra note 2, arts. 52-54, 58.
22. For a complete review of these issues, see Osgood, U.S. Security Interests
in Ocean Law, 2 OCEAN DEVELOPMENT INT'L L. 1 (1974).
23. N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1978, at 3, col. 1, 3 (city ed.).

Winter 1978]

LAW OF THE SEA

continuing maintenance of military supply lines to Israel. The retention of the right of straits passage to permit access for conventional military purposes remains important to the United States
and the rest of the world. In certain situations straits provide the
only viable access to an area. In other situations, the alternative
route would be costly, time-consuming, and possibly dangerous.
Although United States military involvement in any area of the
world should be avoided if possible, the flexibility which access for
conventional military activities provides would appear to diminish
pressure to take the more drastic nuclear alternative. The continued maintenance of the right of straits passage would also decrease
the possibility of involvement or conflict with straits states in cases
where the United States exercises its claim to transit straits in
order to -get conventional military access to areas of interest. The
transit passage rule essentially requires that the straits states remain neutral in such situations, insulating themselves from involvement in third party disputes. Thus, from a military use
perspective, the United States does have a substantial interest in
straits passage.
It is unclear what control the straits states would realize under
the no-convention alternative. Under current international law, a
vessel transiting a territorial sea strait is subject to the regime of
non-suspendable innocent passage.2 4 The definition of "innocent"
is both vague and capable of subjective application. Thus, under
traditional international law a straits state could prevent passage
which it decides is not innocent. Depending on the circumstances
and the interpretation of the term, military vessels engaged in
certain activities could arguably be precluded from transiting such
straits. Furthermore, increased nationalism and the increased legitimacy of measures to protect the marine environment necessarily point in the direction of greater straits state claims of jurisdiction. This could ultimately result in required prior notification by
a transiting vessel, required prior straits state consent, as well as
possible unilaterally imposed construction, manning, and operation requirements that could prejudice United States military interests.
The United States has a commercial navigation interest in
transit passage through and over straits, but it may not be as
compelling as the military interest. As the world's largest trader,
24. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, opened for
signature April 29, 1958, arts. 14-23, 15 U.S.T. 1607, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516
U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force Sept. 10, 1964).
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the United States has a clear interest in maximum transit freedoms. Actual or perceived limitations on commercial transit will
result in diminished use and/or increased cost of transportation.
Although the ICNT regime would assure the minimum possible
interference obtainable at this time, it is not clear that the noconvention alternative would result in significant additional inhibitions on commercial activities, except perhaps in politicomilitary confrontations. Traditionally, coastal state treatment of
commercial ships in innocent passage has not resulted in undue
limitations. Although nations are increasingly aware of environmental needs and desirous of exercising national sovereignty, their
interests have not changed so drastically that they will necessarily
impose significant new restrictions on commercial transit at an
early date. Rather, it is likely that the expansion of straits state
jurisdiction would be incremental, following the laws of creeping
jurisdiction. Although denials of a right to transit a strait may be
rare, such denials could come at the most critical times since
greater straits state control would necessarily involve the straits
state in any third party dispute in which a disputant used the
strait for access purposes. Thus, it appears that so-called creeping
straits state jurisdiction is likely to take place if no Law of the Sea
Convention enters into force.
The second issue with respect to navigation is whether transit
rights could be protected independent of the Convention. Since the
straits states will make some claims to control traffic in their respective straits, the burden of limiting coastal state control to
acceptable bounds will be upon those states interested in navigation through straits." Could this expansion of strait state jurisdiction be thwarted in the absence of a convention? In preparation for
this potential struggle, the United States is already considering its
options.2" There is talk of diplomatic initiatives and cooperative
United States-Soviet task forces being used to maintain the desired transit rights by steaming through international straits. It is
unlikely that the straits states would directly interfere with such
25. There is a distinct possibility that some or all of the important strait states
would not become parties to a Law of the Sea Convention of the nature being
discussed. A broadly accepted convention, however, would have the practical if
not legal effect of proscribing extensive jurisdictional claims by the non-party
strait states.
26. In what may be a precursor of the United States position, a long-time
negotiator for the United States on this issue has recently published an article
opining that such transit rights are extant in current public international law.
Oxman, supra note 1, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. at 63 n.27.
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transiting actions, but the lack of interference would not mean that
the actions would be successful or that they would not involve costs
and risks. Such actions would be expensive and would exacerbate
relations between the United States and the straits states subjected to this kind of action. It is likely that only the major straits
would be transited regularly, leaving the many minor straits open
to coastal state claims. Finally, such actions would not assure such
transit rights for unprotected commercial shipping and research
vessels. Although user state retaliation might be threatened, it is
probable that the private companies, research institutions, and
perhaps ultimately the United States would acquiesce to incremental increases in coastal state control over shipping activities
because the cost would be minimal.
Alternatively, the maritime countries could seek to negotiate
bilateral or limited multilateral agreements with the straits states.
While such agreements are possible, it is clear that the costs required to conclude such agreements would exceed those currently
contemplated within the Law of the Sea negotiations. As discussed
above, there are numerous reasons why the United States is pursuing a comprehensive Convention on the Law of the Sea. The same
is true in the case of the straits states. 7 Thus, the bilateral negotiations for transit rights through an individual nation's straits would
involve dynamics different from those found at the Law of the Sea
negotiations. A more direct quid pro quo could be demanded by
the straits states, particularly in situations where the maritime
states have significant interests in transit through the strait. Furthermore, by entry into such agreements the maritime states
would at least tacitly recognize the legitimacy of the straits states'
right to consent to passage, leaving open the possibility that more
substantial costs would be imposed if the agreement were to be
abrogated or renegotiated at some future time. Finally, it is likely
that a comprehensive Law of the Sea Convention would be more
durable than a limited agreement with specific straits states, many
of which have governments that are of questionable stability over
the long-term.
The same analysis can be brought to bear on similar issues arising in the Exclusive Economic Zone and Archipelagic waters. As
the negotiations proceeded, it became clear that the continuation
of high seas uses within 200 miles of the coast and waters adjacent
to archipelagoes were also at risk. The compromises with respect
27.

See page 44 supra.
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to the Exclusive Economic Zone negotiated at the 1977 session of
the Conference appear to favor continued protections for these
high seas uses, albeit somewhat ambiguously. 8 Greater threats to
such uses would clearly develop without a convention. Although
the tactics used to maintain those high seas rights might be the
same as in the case of the straits issue, the results would be less
likely to succeed for two reasons. First, the United States interests
in the maintenance of such rights, although strong, are not as
imperative as straits passage, because outside of closed seas there
are alternative routes and locations for the relevant high seas uses
beyond the 200-mile zone and archipelagoes. Second, the areas are
so diffuse and large that effective transiting actions would require
considerably more effort. Thus, the entry into force of the Convention best protects these interests within the 200-mile zone and
archipelagic waters, as well as within straits used for international
navigation.
E. Seabed Exploitation
The final and perhaps most controversial interest to be discussed
concerns seabed exploitation. There is little dispute over the regime for the continental shelf. With or without the Convention the
coastal states will have jurisdiction over all seabed resources
within 200 miles from shore and probably further in the case of
very broad continental margins. Apparently, this will assure undisputed coastal state rights in virtually all of the petroleum products
of the oceans.2" Thus, the only significant remaining seabed issue
is the regime for the deep seabed beyond coastal state jurisdiction.
The subject is relatively new in international law and relations and
has been tied to broader international issues. Consequently, the
negotiation of this regime has been complicated and difficult.
28. ICNT, supra note 2, arts. 55, 56, 58, 86-89.
29. It is estimated that only 1 to 5% of the seabed petroleum is located beyond
200 miles from shore, with 0 to 2% located in the deep seabed. Charney, The
Equitable Sharing of Revenues from Seabed Mining, POLICY IssUES IN OcfAl LAW
53, 68 (American Society of International Law Studies in Transnational Legal
Policy No. 8, 1975).
The group of over 50 Landlocked and Geographically Disadvantaged States has
sought access to these resources of the continental shelf. In the face of strong

coastal state resistance it appears that they will be forced to settle for something
less.
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1. Legal-Political Background
There had been only limited interest in the deep seabed, primarily from marine scientists and military strategists, prior to the
recent expansion of commercial efforts to develop a technology
capable of mining deep seabed manganese nodules. Such nodules
contain significant amounts of nickel, copper, cobalt, manganese,
and other metals. A few companies believe that they will be able
to profitably exploit these metals.3 0 Since international law is a
reflection of nations' needs, no doctrine of general international
law or treaty has directly addressed the legal regime for commercial mining of the deep seabed. The first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958 produced the Convention on
the Continental Shelf, which codified the law for the continental
shelf.3 1 Because the participants in that Conference believed that
many years would pass before it would be necessary to address the
law for the deep seabed, that subject was ignored. The 1958 Conference also produced the Convention on the High Seas, which
codified the law of the high seas applicable to the oceans beyond
32
the territorial sea.
To the extent that any positive doctrine of international law
could be said to apply to the deep seabed at that time, that doctrine would have been the regime of the high seas. The doctrine of
the high seas permits nations to make reasonable non-exclusive
use of the resources of the high seas, including the exploitation of
its resources; conversely, it forbids any long-term appropriation of
any part of the area. 3 Historically, the law of the high seas has
30. Economic Implications of Seabed Mineral Development in the International Area: Report of the Secretary General, 3 U.N. L.O.S. I O.R. 4, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 62/25 (1974) [hereinafter cited as U.N. Report]; NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES, MINING IN THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF AND THE DEEP OCEAN

69-102

(1975). For a list of companies formed for commercial recovery of manganese
nodules, see SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., 1ST
SESS., OCEAN MANGANESE NODULES 15, Table I-1 (Comm. Print 1975).

The potential for exploitation of other deep seabed resources cannot be ignored,
although little is known about the nature of the resources at this time.
31. Convention on the Continental Shelf, supra note 16.
32. Convention on the High Seas, supra note 16.

33. A similar result could be obtained by assuming that no international law
is applicable because restrictions on the actions of nations through international
law may not be presumed. The S.S. Lotus, [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. a, No. 10. Thus,
there would be no restriction on nations' actions with respect to the deep seabed
but for general international obligations of nations to act reasonably vis-a-vis
each other. See L. HENKIN, LAW FOR THE SEAS MINERAL REsOURCES (Institute for
the Study of Science in Human Affairs, Monograph No. 1, 1968); Burton,
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been appropriate for the traditional transient uses of the
seas-fishing, commercial navigation, overflight, and military
uses. However, it is inappropriate for the taking of deep seabed
manganese nodules where the assurance of exclusive rights to exploit a specific seabed area appears necessary for financial, equipment design, and planning purposes. Consequently, when the
question of the legal regime for the deep seabed resources was first
directly addressed, it was recognized that the law needed to be
created or at least clarified. Although tenable legal arguments existed to support a right to claim exclusive seabed rights on the
theory that the seabed was res nullius (comparable to unclaimed
territories), this theory appears to have been eschewed by the international community in favor of a theory approaching the doctrine of res communis, which recognizes a community interest in
the deep seabed forbidding permanent appropriation by any nation. 4
Prior to the commencement of the Law of the Sea Conference, a
series of United Nations General Assembly resolutions were passed
relating to the regime for the deep seabed.3 Much disagreement
exists concerning the effect and meaning of the 1969 United Nations General Assembly Moratorium Resolution and the 1970 Resolution declaring the deep seabed as the common heritage of mankind, to be exploited pursuant to an international regime yet to be
negotiated." Many nations, including all of the developing counFreedom of the Seas: International Law Applicable to Deep Seabed Mining
Claims, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1135 (1977).
34. L. HENKIN, supra note 33.
35. G.A. Res. 2574, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 10, U.N. Doc. A/7630
(1969) (adopted by a vote of 62 to 28, with 28 abstentions) declared a moratorium
on claims to national jurisdiction to the seabed "beyond the limits of national
jurisdicton." G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970) (adopted by a vote of 108 to 0, with 14 abstentions) sought to declare the
principles governing the seabed, the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction. G.A. Res. 2750, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
28) 25, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) called for the convening of a Law of the Sea
Conference.
36. The key paragraphs of the Declaration of Principles in G.A. Res. 2749,
supra note 35, are:
1. The sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the

limits of national jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the area), as well
as the resources of the area, are the common heritage of mankind.

2. The area shall not be subject to appropriation by any means by
States or persons, natural or juridical, and no State shall claim or exercise

sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part thereof.
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tries, argue that the resolutions established the resources of the
deep seabed as the common property of all mankind. Thus, a
nation would commit a violation of international law if it exploited
the deep seabed outside of the context of an international agreement. Other countries maintain that the resolutions have no legal
effect, merely calling for a negotiation that would give content to
the words "the common heritage of mankind." The United States,
as a prominent supporter of the latter view, maintains that deep
seabed mining is a right protected under the regime for the high
seas unless and until a new binding international convention on
37
the subject comes into force.

United Nations General Assembly resolutions have no independent binding effect. Those who wish to restrict nations' activities
in the deep seabed have assumed a heavy burden, particularly in
light of strong opposition by the United States and other developed
countries. Nevertheless, the relevant national and corporate practice thus far has been to refrain from engaging in significant deep
seabed mining activities largely consistent with restrictions on the
right to exploit the seabed. Thus, a persuasive legal argument that
nations may not unilaterally exploit the resources of the deep
seabed can be grounded upon one interpretation of the Common
Heritage Resolution, the Moratorium Resolution,38 and interna3. No State or person, natural or juridical, shall claim, exercise or acquire rights with respect to the area or its resources incompatible with the
international regime to be established and the principles of this Declaration.
4. All activities regarding the exploration and exploitation of the resources of the area and other related activities shall be governed by the
international regime to be established.
The Moratorium Resolution, G.A. Res. 2574, supra note 35, adopted by a bare
2/3 vote with the United States voting against, calls on nations to refrain from
seabed exploitation beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
37. For a collection of such statements, see Deep Seabed Mining and the Law
of the Sea: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on International Organizationsof the
House Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-19 (1977)
(statement of Congressman John B. Breaux) [hereinafter cited as House
Hearings];Burton, supra note 33.
Regardless of the exact legal interpretation of the term, it is clear that it was
envisaged that the regime would provide significant participation for all countries
under the umbrella of an international organization. All proposals on the subject
during the preparatory work for the Law of the Sea Conference recognized this
assumption. See Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed
and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 28 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 21) 70-164, U.N. Doc. A/9021 (1973).
38. See notes 35 & 36 supra.
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tional practice. Accordingly, a dispute settlement tribunal potentially could find that international law forbids deep seabed mining
absent international agreement.
Although it is unlikely that such a case would ever be submitted
to a tribunal for a binding decision, the judgment of the international community on the legality and/or propriety of the action has
great practical importance. A very large number of nations of every
political and economic persuasion are likely to oppose unilateral
deep seabed mining by one or a few major industrialized countries.
Such opposition has motivated the nations that are developing
mining technology to continue to seek multilateral agreement for
the deep seabed. Thus, an important issue facing the potential
deep seabed exploiters is the uncertainty surrounding the legal and
political status of the deep seabed.
2.

The Deep Seabed Negotiations

At this time agreement on the regime for the deep seabed continues to elude the negotiators, placing the entire Conference in jeopardy. This issue has been under negotiation in the First Committee
of the Conference. Blame may be placed on virtually every participant for the current negotiating difficulties-the United States'
advocacy of a very hard-line, free market approach, Canada's protectionist attitudes, Algeria's revolutionary posture, other nations'
equally inflexible positions, the delegates' inability or unwillingness to develop reliable negotiating processes, the First Committee
Chairman's insensitive actions and the personality conflicts evident throughout much of the negotiations. Despite these problems,
the delegates have agreed on many significant aspects of a regime
for the deep seabed. However, controversial issues remain which,
if not resolved, could cause the negotiations to collapse, leaving
deep seabed mining in the uncertain legal-political environment
discussed above.
The Appendix to this article identifies fifteen significant topics
under negotiation and traces the development of those topics
through three of the most recent negotiating texts,3 9 the Revised
Single Negotiating Text (RSNT),0 the Evensen Text,4 and the
39. For a review of the prior deep seabed texts, see Charney, The International
Regime for the Deep Seabed: Past Conflicts and Proposalsfor Progress,17 HARv.
INT'L L.J. 1 (1976).

40.

U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP.8fRev. Part I (1976) [hereinafter cited as

RSNT].
41.

Suggested compromise formulations, First Committee Chairman's Nego-
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ICNT.4 2 Part I of the Revised Single Negotiating Text is a product
of the Conference session held in spring, 1976. It is viewed as the
best text that western-developed consumer nations such as the
United States, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, and West
Germany could obtain. In fact, its status as a Committee text has
been contested by the Group of 77 because it is alleged to be the
product of the negotiations of a small non-representative secret
group of delegates. The unofficial Evensen Text was produced during the 1977 session of the Conference. 3 This text was openly discussed within the Committee I Working Group and appeared to
constitute an acceptable middle ground for all but the most radical
of the Group of 77. The substance of the deep seabed portion of
the ICNT44 is the third text described in the Appendix. That text
was supposed to represent the most current text under negotiation
in Committee I. After receipt of the Evensen Text the Chairman
revised it without consultation with the Committee or a representative subgroup." The United States and other developed countries
have maintained that the resulting text is a drastic departure from
the compromises reached in the Working Group unduly favoring
the position of the radicals in the Group of 77 and others that want
to delay or block deep seabed mining. Consequently, the ICNT has
become highly controversial on both procedural and substantive
grounds, stimulating efforts to fashion a Conference-wide strategy
capable of producing compromises that could be generally acceptable at the 1978 session of the Conference.
Intersessional meetings during the winter of 1977-78 made it
clear that substantial changes in the ICNT and Conference procedures would be needed if an agreement is to be forthcoming. There
appears to be agreement that the Committee structure would be
tiating Group, U.N. L.O.S. III, U.N. Informal Doe. No. 77-76653 (July 5, 1977);
Suggested compromise formulation, First Committee Chairman's Negotiating
Group, U.N. L.O.S. III, U.N. Informal Doc. No. 77-76619 (June 29, 1977); Suggested compromise formula, U.N. L.O.S. III, U.N. Informal Doc. No. 77-76231 (3d
rev. June 11, 1977).
42. See note 2 supra.
43. The Committee I Working Group, under the chairmanship of Minister
Jens Evensen of Norway, produced the text. Informal Composite Negotiating
Text, Explanatory Memorandum by the President 5, A/CONF. 62/WP.10/Add. 1
(1977); Report of the United States Delegation, U.N. L.O.S. I at 1 (6th sess.
May 23-July 15, 1977) (unclassified).
44. ICNT, supra note 2, pt. XI; id. annexes II, III.
45. Informal Composite Negotiating Text, Explanatory Memorandum by the
President, supra note 43, at 5-6; see Report of the United States Delegation, supra
note 43, at 5.
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virtually dissolved, thereby unifying and centralizing the negotiation process. The success of this new approach will not be known
until the conclusion of the 1978 formal session of the Conference."
Despite these problems a review of the Appendix shows that
much is unchanged from text to text, indicating that tentative
agreement has been reached on many aspects of the deep seabed
regime. 7 All texts would establish an International Seabed Authority under which all deep seabed mining would be conducted.
The organs of the Authority would include a one-nation, one-vote
Assembly, a structured Council, functional commmissions, an
Enterprise, and a Secretariat.48 In addition, a dispute settlement
system would be created. 9 Although the Convention would specify
many policies, the Assembly would establish other general policies."0 The Council would set specific policies and would be concerned more directly with resource exploitation, principally the
approval or rejection of specific exploration and exploitation activities pursuant to the recommendations of the Technical Commission.5 1 The Council would be structured to represent the various
political and economic interests, and the Technical Commission
would consist of experts appointed by the Council.12 A Rules and
Commission
Regulations Commission and an Economic Planning
3
Council.1
the
of
operations
the
would complement
Exploration and exploitation would be conducted under the socalled "parallel system." Private and state enterprises would be
virtually free to conduct deep seabed prospecting. Once sites have
been identified for exploration and potential exploitation, the private or state enterprise would submit an application under the
sponsorship of its state for a contract to explore and exploit either
46. The intersessional meetings in New York in February 1978 saw deep
seabed negotiations take place outside of Committee I with the ICNT serving as
the text to be discussed and modified. These negotiations produced no dramatic
substantive developments. Another significant obstacle to substantive and procedural progress has been the question of the continuing presidency of Hamilton
Shirley Amerasinghe. This issue was under discussion at the Conference as this
article went to press.
47. The negotiations have been conducted with reference to manganese nodule production. Although the text is broad enough to encompass any other
resource, its application may not be satisfactory.
48. ICNT, supra note 2, art. 156.
49. Id, art. 187; id, annex V.
50. Id. arts. 136-53, 158.
51. Id. arts. 160, 163.
52. Id. arts. 159, 163.
53. Id. arts. 162, 164.
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one of two equal areas of the seabed. The Authority would then
select one site for the applicant to work and would designate the
other as a reserved area to be exploited by the Enterprise or by
developing countries directly. A contract would be entered into
between the applicant and the Authority if the applicant met all
the requirements of the Convention and those specified in the rules
and regulations of the Authority. In addition to normal qualifications, conditions on transfer of technology, payments to the Authority, and procedures to protect the marine environment would
have to be met.54
An alternative to direct contracting for state and private commercial entities would be to enter into an arrangement with the
exploitation arm of the Authority, the Enterprise, to do all or part
of the mining activities that the Enterprise would wish to conduct.
The Enterprise would appear to be analogous to a corporation
established pursuant to the Convention, with the parties to the
Convention serving as the shareholders.55 This parallel system with
state-sponsored commercial entities on one side and the Enterprise
on the other, would be in force for the first twenty years of the
Convention. It would be subject to renegotiation at a review conference to be held at the conclusion of that period. "
There are three major deep seabed issues requiring resolution:
(1) the political control of the Authority: the Council's jurisdiction,
composition, and voting system; (2) the system of exploitation;
and (3) the Authority's resource policy. Subsidiary issues include
the financial arrangements for contractors, the dispute settlement
system, the review clause, and the provisional entry into force of
the deep seabed text.57 The most important issue is political control. If that issue can be satisfactorily resolved, the balance needed
in the more technical areas would become more apparent. Thus,
if the delegates were to agree on a political structure in which they
had confidence, less pressure would exist to include in the text
many details which present negotiation difficulties due to the lack
of reliable data and the presence of ideological conflicts.
54. Id. arts. 151, 160; id. annex II, paras. 3-5, 10.
55. See id. arts. 151, 169; id. annex I, para. 6; id. annex I.
56. Id. art. 153.
57. There are numerous other technical problems in the text requiring work
by the Drafting Committee of the Conference or other suitably qualified experts.
See, e.g., ICNT, supra note 2, arts. 158(2)(xvi), 160(2)(xiv) (duration and use of
provisional rules and regulations), 177 (whether there are any exceptions to the
privileges and immunities provided in Annex 1i); 178, 181(a) (what organ waives
the Authority's immunities).
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The core of the political issue is found in the Council articles.
Currently, the texts are ambiguous with respect to the power of the
Assembly to dictate Council actions. To the extent that the Assembly could dictate to the Council, the political control would rest in
the one-nation, one-vote Assembly which would be dominated by
the Group of 77. If the Council is vested with independent powers,
the next critical question is its composition and voting system.
A significant difference exists between the treatment of the
Council issue under ICNT and the Evensen Text." Not only does
the ICNT provide for smaller developed country representation in
the Council, but it also eliminates the chambered voting requirement of the Evensen Text which was developed to assure that the
Council's decisions would take into account the views of the relevant interest groups.
The creation of the parallel system is the result of the conflicting
desires of the participants as to the entities that would be able to
exploit the deep seabed. Some nations, particularly the Group of
77, wish to see the Enterprise have the exclusive right to exploit
the resource, while others, particularly the major industrialized
countries, have sought a system that would provide for the assured
right of state and private companies to exploit. The parallel system
was developed to assure access to the Enterprise as well as state
and private companies. Unless a balance is maintained as to the
conditions on access for each side, it is feared that the disfavored
side would not have effective access to exploit the deep seabed.
A comparison of the RSNT, the Evensen Text, and the ICNT
clearly demonstrates the conflict over the parallel system of exploitation. 9 Although all three use the parallel system approach, the
assurance of access for state and private enterprises to deep seabed
mining varies greatly. The RSNT provides for a relatively secure
right of access for both sides upon satisfaction of specified requirements. However, it contains little to assure that the Enterprise
would ever become operative. In contrast, the ICNT gives the Authority significant powers and discretion to deny and condition
access by state and private enterprises, but provides for little or
no review by the dispute settlement system. The text places no
limitations on the activities of the Enterprise. Furthermore, the
ICNT provides the Enterprise with the benefits of unlimited statefunded financing, mandated transfer of technology, and exclusive
58. See Appendix, infra, subject no. 3.
59. See id. subject no. 6.
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access to one-half of the sites nominated by state and private commercial entities. Thus the system is rendered so out of balance that
it would be likely to lead to exploitation only under the Enterprise.
The Evensen Text would seek to limit and direct the discretion
that is given to the Authority. It would assure conformance with
Convention requirements through the comprehensive dispute settlement system.
The resource policy issue"° has been produced out of the conflict
between the proponents of unrestricted seabed production and the
producers of competing land-based sources of nickel, copper, cobalt, and manganese. The latter are supported by others seeking
to advance the New International Economic Order goals of the
Group of 77. The land-based interests have sought protections
against the adverse impact of seabed mining through general policy statements in the text, the expansion of the power of the Authority, provisions authorizing compensation for the adverse impact of seabed mining competition, as well as the inclusion of
specific production limitations on deep seabed mining. The
strength and the comprehensiveness of those limitations on seabed
mining are at the center of the resource policy issue.
One of the most controversial provisions in the ICNT is the 20year limitation upon the production of nickel from manganese nodules to 60 percent of the cumulative growth segment of the world
demand for nickel. This restriction effectively limits the production of all metals from manganese nodules. This 60 percent figure
is the greatest limitation found in the three texts. The production
limitation provisions raise two significant questions, which are as
yet unanswered: (1) whether the ICNT would so restrict seabed
mining that the industry would choose not to proceed; and (2)
whether the limit contained in the RSNT would permit such large
scale seabed mining that the land-based producers would suffer a
substantial adverse impact. All the evidence available at this point
indicates that the adverse impact of even unrestricted seabed production on the competing land-based producers will be minimal,
except perhaps in the cobalt market." On the other hand, it is not
clear that any of the production limitations would necessarily have

60. See id. subject no. 4.
61. U.N. Report, supra note 30, at 4; Economic Effects of Deep Seabed Exploitation, Working Paper of the United States of America, 3 U.N. L.O.S. I O.R.
164, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/c.1/L.5 (1974).
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a substantial negative impact on the development of the manganese nodule industry."
The other significant outstanding issues are closely related to the
first three. The financial arrangement issue concerns the amount

and nature of the taxes and other fees charged to seabed exploiters." Of course, the nature, extent, and discretion provided will
have a most important impact on the future of deep seabed mining. The dispute settlement issue concerns the availability of third
party dispute settlement that could be important in assuring that
the Authority contractors and nations comply with the terms of the
Convention." The review clause issue arose from a proposal by

then Secretary of State Kissinger aimed at encouraging Group of
62. At the February 1978 informal intersessional meeting of the Conference a
group of experts calculated the amount of nickel that might be produced under
the production limitation used in the ICNT, assuming a 4.5 percent annual
growth in nickel demand. Based upon a three million dry ton per year mining
operation producing 35,100 tons of nickel per year, the following number of sites
would be available:
Year

Total Sites

1985
1990
1995
1999

6.5
7.7
12.8
17.9

-

8.2
9.0
13.7
18.8

Half of those sites would be reserved for the Enterprise to develop. Report of the
Chairman of the Informal Sub-Group of Technical Experts, U.N. L.O.S. I, U.N.
Informal Doc. No. EIEG/1 (Feb. 16, 1978). Coincidentally, a report of the United
States Congressional Research Service estimates a rate of development of the
manganese nodule industry that closely parallels these results. SUBcOMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, HousE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,

95TH CONG., 2D SEss., DEEP SEABED MINERALS: RESOURCES, DIPLOMACY, AND STRATEGIC INTEREST 111-23 (Comm. Print 1978) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE COMMITTEE PRINT].
A further motivation for limitations on the exploitation of the seabed is derived
from a current dispute over the number of actual first generation mine sites that
are available. See generally OCEAN MINING ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, OCEAN MINING: AN ECONOMIC EVALUATION (1976); Menard & Frazer,

Manganese Nodules on the Sea Floor: Inverse CorrelationBetween Grade and
Abundance, 199 SCIENCE 969 (1978). This has given rise to the "anti-monopoly"
provisions, which are aimed at assuming that a few consortia in Western developed countries do not capture all available sites. See Appendix, infra, subject no.

5.
63. See Appendix, infra, subject no. 7. The implications of the current text
on financial arrangements are demonstrated in charts prepared during the February 1978 intersessional meetings. Hypothetical Calculations Based on Paragraph
7 of Annex II of the ICNT, U.N. L.O.S. I, U.N. Informal Doc. No. 78-75505 (Feb.
10, 1978).

64.

See Appendix, infra, subject no. 13.

Winter 1978]

LAW OF THE SEA

77 flexibility in return for an obligation to renegotiate the major
operative parts of the seabed text at a conference in twenty years.
While virtually all participants appear to support such a review
conference, much dispute exists over whether the text should specify what regime should prevail if the review conferees fail to agree. 5
A final issue to be addressed concerns whether the deep seabed
text would become effective at a very early stage or whether it must
wait for the conclusion of the time-consuming ratification process
needed to bring the entire Law of the Sea Convention into force. 6
Delayed entry into force could defer the commencement of deep
seabed mining.
In summary, the RSNT limits the Authority's power to condition contracts, to vary terms applicable to contracts, and to deny
contracts. The ICNT, in contrast, leaves much room for negotiation and variation, opening the door to the introduction of many
political and economic considerations before and after the issuance
of a contract. It is not clear which result would be in the best
interests of private industry. It would like to have the certainty and
predictability produced by limited Authority discretion, while at
the same time it needs sufficient flexibility to permit the regime
to adjust requirements in order to meet new commercial, environmental, and safety needs. This need for flexibility, particularly
acute in a new industry, must be counterbalanced by the desire for
certainty and evenhandedness. The conflict is particularly significant because the negotiations are being conducted in the context
of a sometimes acrimonious north-south confrontation. This confrontation might be carried into the Authority to the detriment of
the future of deep seabed mining.
3.

The Future Legal Regime for the Deep Seabed

If the Law of the Sea negotiations are successful, the Convention
produced will probably provide for a regime that closely resembles
that found in the Evensen Text. Alternative regimes, such as a
licensing system, a unitary joint venture system, or a clean parallel
system do not appear to be negotiable at this stage.
Since the ICNT treatment of the deep seabed items previously
discussed will not be accepted by the United States and certain
other developed countries, there appear to be only two alternatives
open to the Conference: (1) to move toward the kinds of solutions
65.
66.

See id. subject no. 14.
See id. subject no. 15.
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found in the Evensen Text, or (2) to develop a text that does not
resolve the remaining issues, but defers them to a future negotiation under the same rules used at the Conference. Many negotiators favor the approach used in the Evensen Text because it came
very close to producing agreement at the 1977 session.
Developments subsequent to the 1977 session have made it clear
that the Conference will follow precedent by proceeding to negotiate on the basis of the latest official text, the ICNT, despite objections on procedure and substance. Similarly, the previous unofficial text, the Evensen Text, will be technically disregarded." Thus,
efforts to return to the approach used in the Evensen Text will be
time-consuming and difficult. Unfortunately, even if the effort
were to succeed, the legal regime developed may not produce optimum results, particularly because the regime found in the Evensen
Text is very complex and contains inherent conflicts.
The alternative "framework" approach avoids substantive decisions and may be acceptable for that reason." Further deferred
negotiations may provide the opportunity to develop a superior
legal regime that may be in the long-term interests of all. Nevertheless, such a deferral has two drawbacks. First, it would inevitably be tied to a moratorium on deep seabed mining which may
adversely affect some potential mining companies, although a
67. At the 1976 spring session in New York the informal "Pinto" text was
discarded in favor of the controversial Informal Single Negotiating Text produced
by the Chairman of the First Committee. Similarly, at the 1976 summer meeting
in New York, the Revised Single Negotiating Text was used as the basis of discussion despite significant objections.
68. Such a framework regime could take many forms. One possible approach
would be to retain as much as is generally agreed to in Part XI of the ICNT,
leaving the remaining open issues for further negotiation within the Assembly.
Articles 133-49, 168, 170, and 186 clearly could be agreed upon at an early date.
Similarly, the organizational structure of the International Seabed Authority
contained within articles 187-92 could be settled. The Basic Conditions of Exploration and Exploitation, Annex II, the Statute of the Enterprise, Annex I, as
well as article 169, which authorizes the Establishment of the Enterprise, would
be deferred. On the other hand, the general outline of an Enterprise and perhaps
even generally recommended resource policies along the lines of article 150(1)
might also be able to be settled. Further negotiations of the treaty and annexes
would take place within the Assembly under the same rules of procedure as used
in the Law of the Sea Conference. All recommendations would need state ratification.
Such an approach would in fact be in conformity with the Conference's treatment of most other subjects. As the discussion in the text indicates, many detailed issues have been deferred to future negotiations. It should be clear to the
participating nations that a large multilateral conference is not the place to
negotiate detailed arrangements.
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short-term moratorium would produce no significant adverse impact on the potential consumer nations. 9 Second, it is believed
that absent a substantive settlement on the deep seabed mining
regime, many countries would have no strong interest in concluding the broader Law of the Sea Convention. Such a deferral of the
entire Convention could be detrimental to many United States
interests.
The other participants, however, particularly the developing
countries, do have an interest in concluding a Convention on the
Law of the Sea independent of a complete resolution of the deep
seabed issue. There are at least five categories of interests which
they appear to have. First, many have substantive interests in the
terms of a convention which may limit the actions of others or
legitimatize their own, in such areas as the Exclusive Economic
Zone, Archipelagic waters, straits, the rights of the landlocked and
geographically disadvantaged states, and revenue sharing. Second,
many have an interest in playing some role in seabed development,
even if only to assure that the development is limited. Third, the
Group of 77 has a substantial interest in protecting the viability
of multilateral negotiations in order to assure their use elsewhere
and to improve the prestige of the United Nations system. The
members of the Group of 77 recognize that the effectiveness of the
Group in international affairs is heavily dependent upon negotiation in a multilateral forum. A failure at the Law of the Sea Conference would prejudice the continuing use of multilateral negotiations. Fourth, they could benefit from the expanded use of compulsory dispute settlement which would increase the likelihood that
international issues would be resolved on terms other than the
geopolitical strength of the adversaries. Finally, the ego involvement of the many long-term delegates to the Conference and the
supporting national and United Nations bureaucracies cannot be
ignored. They see themselves as having a large investment in the
success of the Conference. Consequently, they will try to avoid a
total failure.
69. Neither an early shortage of those metals nor effective producer cartels
appear likely. See Metals from Deep Seabed Nodules: U.S. Dependence on
Nickel, Copper, Cobalt, and Manganese and Feasibilityof CartelAction, House
Hearings, supra note 37, at 109 (report by James E. Mielke); HOUSE COMM ITEE
PRINT, supra note 62, at 42-78; Charney, supra note 1, at 620.
To be negotiable, the moratorium would have to be either limited in duration
or limited to a "reasonable time for serious negotiations to take place." Upon
dissolution of the moratorium all nations would be placed in the uncertain legalpolitical status quo ante.
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If the Conference fails to produce a generally acceptable regime,
those countries that are most highly motivated to commence deep
seabed mining at an early date would have to make some hard
choices. At present, the passage of unilateral domestic legislation
appears likely."0 Consideration is also being given to the negotiation of a treaty among interested nations that would be open to all
countries. Although it is unlikely that any but the most industrialized western countries would join such a treaty, its existence might
tend to legitimatize deep seabed mining. It would probably purport to give private companies the right to apply for licenses for
deep seabed mining under domestic regulation. Nevertheless, if
effective, the treaty essentially would cut the rest of the world out
of participation in the regime for the mining of the deep seabed.
Whether deep seabed mining proceeds at an early date under
such a mini-treaty and/or unilateral legislation depends upon at
least five factors. The first factor is the actual economic and strategic value of deep seabed mining to the countries likely to engage
in such mining. Currently, its value is low." Second, the effectiveness of the reactions by the Group of 77 and the other land-based
producers to unilateral mining is dependent upon a number of
factors: the degree of animosity present when the Conference concludes, the presence of an aggressive leader of the opposition
group, the state of other north-south relations, and the significance
of the threat that deep seabed mining would pose to land-based
producers. Third, early seabed mining may be opposed by the
Soviet Union. The decision of the Soviets could be influenced by
the state of East-West relations, their desire to curry favor with the
Group of 77, and their estimate of the effect that delayed deep
seabed mining would have on their economic interests. Fourth, the
tactics adopted by the opposition to deep seabed mining must be
considered. These tactics could include jawboning, a request for an
70. See H.R. 3350, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. H1074, E693 (1977)
(to Committee on International Relations on Nov. 7, 1977); H. R. REP. No. 588,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 2053, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc.
S13924, S13980 (1977); Mining of the Deep Seabed: Hearings on S. 2053 Before
the Subcomm. on Public Lands and Resources of the Senate Comm. on Energy
and Natural Resources and the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation,95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). For a consideration of a similar bill
in the 94th Congress, see S. REP. No. 754, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
71. See Testimony of David E. McGiffert, Ass't Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, before the House Committee on International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (unpublished); note 69 & accompanying text

supra.
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International Court of Justice advisory opinion, the passage of
United Nations resolutions, the conclusion of a separately negotiated deep seabed treaty, suits in the International Court of Justice,
and economic retaliation against the countries and companies connected with the unilateral deep seabed mining. The tactical option
of linking deep seabed mining to other international issues is also
available. For example, if in the unlikely case OPEC linked access
to petroleum to unilateral action, support for unilateral action in
Western Europe and Japan would decrease significantly. Fifth, the
timing and tactics used by those seeking deep seabed mining will
be important. If unilateral actions are taken shortly after the end
of negotiations, the former negotiators will be in a position to assure coordinated actions in opposition to unilateral action. Similarly, brazen actions by the potential deep seabed miners could
create the incident that could spark significant coordinated reactions.
Considered in its entirety, unilateral deep seabed mining has the
potential of becoming a cause celebre of the Group of 77, creating
a difficult situation for the United States. Accordingly, an unstable situation is likely to result if the Conference fails. Assessed in
the light of the political, legal, and economic uncertainties facing
deep seabed mining, it seems unlikely that strong support would
be forthcoming from the key developed western countries for a
rapid development of deep seabed mining. If this presumption is
correct, the no-conference route would produce at best little or no
deep seabed mining for a number of years. Individual states might
thereafter proceed to conduct some commercial mining, near their
land possessions. If seabed mining is found profitable, customary
international law may develop which will permit mining by nationals and licensees only in deep ocean areas adjacent to the Exclusive
Economic Zones of their respective countries. Such a development
could lead to the evolution of extended zones of national jurisdiction that may pose problems to the exercise of high seas freedoms
by the United States. At some point, international agreement on
some limited revenue sharing might evolve. However, the development of an international regime as envisioned in the current negotiations will be unlikely once this Conference ends.
Deep seabed mining under the ICNT's International Seabed
Authority appears to be a dismal alternative. The Authority would
contain a large bureaucracy possibly armed with the potential to
disrupt or even foreclose deep seabed mining. Nevertheless, it is
reasonable to believe that in practice the Authority's actions would
not approach even the worst case analysis, for three reasons: (1)
adequate protections against unreasonable Authority actions are
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likely to emerge from the negotiations; (2) once the Authority
comes into operation with the likely infusion of more technicallyoriented persons and the diffusion of the international diplomats
and lawyers, the drive may well be to encourage and develop
seabed mining; and (3) movement toward seabed development will
be assured through a balanced Council and an effective dispute
settlement system.
It is hard to predict with any degree of certainty what the legal
regime for deep seabed mining will be. It is equally difficult to
predict which alternative would be superior from the point of view
of industry, government, or the public. Nevertheless, it still appears that the international regime route is superior for the United
States. While a comprehensive international regime has many
advantages, the problems besetting the Conference give rise to
legitimate fears that the international regime route may not realize
its potential. Although many believe that the United States has
already invested too much in the negotiations and that further
efforts would not be cost-effective, the pursuit of an international
regime appears worthy of a continuing effort.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The review of the United States interests at stake at the Law of
the Sea Conference reveals that the Convention would provide
certain benefits to the United States not available in the absence
of a convention. Although the benefits to be derived from the Convention in some substantive areas are not overwhelming, in the
case of navigation and the other related ocean uses, the Convention
route would provide significant advantages over the alternatives.
The impact of the deep seabed issue is still undecided. A regime
on the deep seabed that provides for a well-constituted Council
and a system of exploitation that reasonably assures that deep
seabed mining would be able to proceed subject to rational regulation is in the best interest of the United States. Such a regime
should be sought even if it means a further deferral of the date on
which mining will commence. When all of the United States substantive interests in a Law of the Sea Convention are added to the
more general international relations interests that could be enhanced by the successful conclusion of the negotiations, it becomes clear that the United States possesses a substantial interest
in the success of the Conference even though individual interests
may not be overwhelming, At the present time there is some possibility that an acceptable Convention can be negotiated. While
that possibility remains, the United States should continue to pursue the Convention route.
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